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Financial incentives for teachers to increase student performance is an increasingly popular education
policy around the world. This paper describes a school-based randomized trial in over two-hundred
New York City public schools designed to better understand the impact of teacher incentives on student
achievement. I find no evidence that teacher incentives increase student performance, attendance, or
graduation, nor do I find any evidence that the incentives change student or teacher behavior. If anything,
teacher incentives may decrease student achievement, especially in larger schools. The paper concludes
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rfryer@fas.harvard.eduWhen I was in Chicago, our teachers designed a program for performance pay and secured a
$27 million federal grant. ... In Chicago’s model – every adult in the building – teachers, clerks,
janitors and cafeteria workers – all were rewarded when the school improved. It builds a sense of
teamwork and gives the whole school a common mission. It can transform a school culture.
- Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, The National Press Club, July 27, 2010
1 Introduction
Many educational reforms have been attempted over the past few decades with the goal of increasing
academic achievement: lowering class size, increasing spending, providing incentives for teachers
to obtain more education, and so on.1 In 1961, 23.5 percent of teachers had a Master’s degree
or a higher degree. In 2001, 56.8 percent of teachers had at least a Master’s degree. Student to
teacher ratios in public schools have decreased from over 22 to 1 in 1971 to less than 16 to 1 in
2001, a decrease of 33 percent in class size in 30 years. America spends more on education than it
has ever before: per-pupil spending has increased (in 2005 dollars) from approximately $4,700 per
student in 1970 to over $10,000 (Snyder and Dillow, 2010). Yet, despite these reforms to increase
achievement, Figure 1 demonstrates that test scores have been largely constant over the past thirty
years.
Human capital, especially teacher quality, is believed to be one of the most important inputs into
education production. A one-standard deviation increase in teacher quality raises math achievement
by 0.15 to 0.24 standard deviations per year and reading achievement by 0.15 to 0.20 standard
deviations per year (Rockoﬀ, 2004; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2005; Aaronson et al., 2007; Kane and
Staiger, 2008). The diﬃculty, however, is that one cannot identify ex ante the most productive
teachers. Value added measures are not strongly correlated with observable teacher characteristics
1There have been many other attempts to increase achievement and close the achievement gap. Early childhood
interventions such as Head Start, Nurse-Family Partnership, and the Abecedarian Project boost kindergarten readi-
ness, but the eﬀects on achievement often fade once children enter school (Currie and Thomas, 1995; Olds, 2006).
More aggressive strategies that place disadvantaged students in better schools through busing (Angrist and Lang,
2004) or through school choice plans (Rouse, 1998; Krueger and Zhu, 2004; Cullen et al., 2005; Hastings et al., 2006)
have also left the racial achievement gap essentially unchanged. School districts have been sources of innovative
strategies, including smaller schools and classrooms (Fin and Achilles, 1999; Nye et al., 1995; Krueger, 1999; Krueger
and Whitmore, 2001; Jepsen and Rivkin, 2002), mandatory summer school (Jacob and Lefgren, 2004), student incen-
tives (Bettinger, 2010; Fryer, 2010), after-school programs (Lauer et al., 2006; Redd et al., 2002), budget, curricula,
and assessment reorganization (Borman et al., 2003; Borman et al., 2007; Cook et al., 2000), and policies to lower
the barrier to teaching via alternative paths to accreditation (Decker et al., 2004; Kane et al., 2008).
2(Aaronson et al., 2007; Rivkin et al., 2005; Kane and Staiger, 2008; Rockoﬀ et al., 2008). Some
argue that this, coupled with the inherent challenges in removing low performing teachers and
increased job market opportunities for women, contributes to the fact that teacher quality and
aptitude has declined signiﬁcantly in the past 40 years (Corcoran et al., 2004; Hoxby and Leigh,
2004).2
One potential method to increase student achievement and improve the quality of individuals
selecting teaching as a profession is to provide teachers with ﬁnancial incentives based on student
achievement. Theoretically, teacher incentives could have one of the three eﬀects. If teachers lack
motivation or incentive to put eﬀort into lesson planning, parental engagement, and so on, ﬁnancial
incentives for student achievement may have a positive impact by motivating teachers to increase
their eﬀort. If, however, teacher incentives have unintended consequences such as explicit cheating,
teaching to the test, or focusing on speciﬁc, tested objectives at the expense of more general
learning, teacher incentives can have a negative impact on student performance (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991; Jacob and Levitt, 2003). Similarly, some argue that teacher incentives can decrease
a teacher’s intrinsic motivation or lead to harmful competition between teachers in what some
believe to be a collaborative environment (Johnson, 1984; Firestone and Pennell, 1993). Third, if
teachers do not know how to increase student achievement, the production function has important
complementarities outside their control, or the incentives are either confusing or too weak, teacher
incentives may have no impact on achievement.
There has been growing enthusiasm among education reformers and policy makers around the
world to link teacher compensation to student achievement in myriad ways.3 This is due, in part, to
the low correlation between a teacher’s observables at the time of hiring and his value-added, and,
in part, to policy makers’ belief that a new payment scheme will attract more achievement-minded
applicants. A number of states, including Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, South Carolina,
2Corcoran et al. (2004) ﬁnd that in the 1964-1971 period, 20-25 percent of new female teachers were ranked in
the top 10 percent of their high school cohort, while in 2000, less than 13 percent were ranked at the top decile.
Hoxby and Leigh (2004) similarly ﬁnd that the share of teachers in the highest aptitude category fell from 5 percent
in 1963 to 1 percent in 2000 and the share in the lowest aptitude category rose from 16 percent to 36 percent in the
same period.
3Merit pay faces opposition from the the two major unions: The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the
National Education Association (NEA). Though in favor of reforming teacher compensation systems, the AFT and
the NEA oﬃcially object to programs that reward teachers based on student test scores and principal evaluations,
while favoring instead systems that reward teachers based on additional roles and responsibilities they take within
the school or certiﬁcations and qualiﬁcations they accrue. The AFT’s oﬃcial position cites the past underfunding
of such programs, the confusing metrics by which teachers were evaluated, and the crude binary reward system in
which there is no gradation of merit as the reasons for its objection. The NEA’s oﬃcial position maintains that any
alterations in compensation should be bargained at the local level, and that a singular salary scale and a strong base
salary should be the standard for compensation.
3Tennessee, Texas, and Washington, D.C., have implemented statewide programs for districts and
schools to provide individual and group incentives to teachers for student achievement and growth,
and many more individual school districts have implemented similar policies. In 2010, the U.S.
Department of Education selected 62 programs in 27 states to receive over $1.2 billion over ﬁve years
from the Teacher Incentive Fund. States applying for funds from “Race to the Top,” the Obama
Administration’s $4.4 billion initiative to reform schools, are evaluated on plans to improve teacher
and principal eﬀectiveness by linking teacher evaluations to student growth and making decisions
about raises, tenure, and promotions depending on student achievement. Similar initiatives are
underway in the United Kingdom, Chile, Mexico, Israel, Australia, Portugal, and parts of India.
The empirical evidence on the eﬃcacy of teacher incentives is ambivalent. Data from ﬁeld
experiments in Kenya and India yield eﬀect sizes of approximately 0.20 standard deviations in
math and reading (Glewwe et al., 2010; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, forthcoming). Data
from a pilot initiative in Tennessee suggests no eﬀects of incentives on student achievement. Other,
non-experimental analyses, of teacher incentive programs in the United States have also shown no
measurable success, though one should interpret these data with caution due to the lack of credible
causal estimates (Glazerman et al., 2009; Vigdor, 2008).
In the 2007-2008 through the 2009-2010 school year, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT)
and the New York City Department of Education (DOE) implemented a teacher incentive program
in over 200 high-need schools, distributing a total of roughly $75 million to over 20,000 teachers.4
The experiment was a randomized school-based trial, with the randomization conducted by the
author. Each participating school could earn $3,000 for every UFT-represented staﬀ member,
which the school could distribute at its own discretion, if the school met the annual performance
target set by the DOE based on school report card scores. Each participating school was given
$1,500 per UFT staﬀ member if it met at least 75% of the target but not the full target. Note:
given that the average New York City public school has roughly sixty teachers, this implies a
transfer of $180,000 to schools on average if they met their annual targets and a transfer of $90,000
if they met at least 75% of, but not the full target. School report card scores hinge on student
performance and progress on state test scores for elementary and middle schools, Regents exam
results and graduation rates for high schools, student attendance, and learning environment survey
results administered to teachers, parents and students for all schools.
4The details of the program were negotiated by Chancellor Joel Klein and Randi Weingarten, along with their
staﬀs. At the time of the negotiation, I was serving as an advisor to Chancellor Klein and convinced both parties
that we should include random assignment to ensure a proper evaluation.
4An important feature of our experiment is that schools had discretion over their incentive plans.
As mentioned above, if a participating school met one-hundred percent of the annual targets, it
received a lump sum equivalent to $3000 per full-time unionized teacher. Each school had the
power to decide whether all of the rewards would be given to a small subset of teachers with the
highest value-added, whether the winners of the rewards would be decided by lottery, and virtually
anything in-between. The only restriction was that schools were not allowed to distribute rewards
based on seniority. Theoretically, it is unclear how to design optimal teacher incentives when the
objective is to improve student achievement. Much depends on the characteristics of the education
production function. If, for instance, the production function is additively separable, then individual
incentives may dominate group incentives, as the latter encourages free-riding. If, however, the
production function has important complementarities between teachers in the production of student
achievement, group incentives may be more eﬀective at increasing achievement (Baker, 2002).
To our surprise, an overwhelming majority of the schools decided on a group incentive scheme
that varied the individual bonus amount only by the position held in the school. This could
be because teachers have superior knowledge of education production and believe the production
function to have important complementarities, because they feared retribution from other teachers
if they supported individual rewards, or simply because this was as close to pay based on seniority
(the UFT’s oﬃcial view) that they could do.
The results from our incentive experiments are informative. Providing incentives to teachers
based on school’s performance on metrics involving student achievement, improvement, and the
learning environment did not increase student achievement in any statistically meaningful way.
If anything, student achievement declined. Intent-to-treat estimates yield treatment eﬀects of -
0.015 (0.024) standard deviations (hereafter σ) in mathematics and -0.011σ (0.020) in reading for
elementary schools, and -0.048σ (0.017) in math and -0.032σ (0.011) in reading for middle schools,
per year. Thus, if an elementary school student attended schools that implemented the teacher
incentive program for three years, her test scores would decline by -0.045σ in math and by -0.033σ
in reading - neither of which is statistically signiﬁcant. For middle school students, however, the
negative impacts are more sizeable: -0.144σ in math and -0.096σ in reading over a three-year period.
The impact of teacher incentives on student attendance, behavioral incidences, and alternative
achievement outcomes such as predictive state assessments, course grades, Regents exam scores,
and high school graduation rates are all negligible. Furthermore, we ﬁnd no evidence that teacher
incentives aﬀect teacher behavior, measured by retention in district or in school, number of per-
5sonal absences, and teacher responses to the learning environment survey, which partly determined
whether a school received the performance bonus.
We also investigate the treatment eﬀects across a range of subsamples – gender, race, previous-
year achievement, previous-year teacher value added, previous-year teacher salary, and school size –
and ﬁnd that although some subgroups seem to be aﬀected diﬀerently by the program, none of the
estimates of the treatment eﬀect are positive and signiﬁcant if one adjusts for multiple hypothesis
testing. The coeﬃcients range from -0.264σ (0.074), in global history for white high school students,
to 0.120σ (0.094), in math state exam scores for white elementary school students.
The paper concludes with a (necessarily) speculative discussion about what can explain the stark
results, especially when one compares them with the growing evidence from developing countries.
One explanation is that incentives are simply not eﬀective in American public schools. This could
be due to a variety of reasons, including diﬀerential teacher characteristics, teacher training, or
eﬀort. We argue that a more likely explanation is that all incentive schemes piloted thus far in
the US, due in part to strong inﬂuence by teacher’s unions, have been more complex and provided
teachers with less agency than incentive experiments in developing countries. This ambiguity and
lack of agency in American incentive schemes, relative to those attempted in developing countries,
may explain our results. Other explanations such as the incentives were not large enough, group-
based incentives are ineﬀective, or teachers are ignorant of the production function all contradict
the data in important ways.
The next section provides a brief review of the emerging literature on the eﬀect of teacher
incentives on student achievement. Section 3 provides details of the experiment and its implemen-
tation. Section 4 describes the data and research design used in the analysis. Section 5 presents
estimates of the impact of teacher incentives on a host of student and teacher outcomes. The ﬁnal
section concludes. There is an online data appendix that provides details on how we construct our
covariates and our sample from the school district administrative ﬁles used in our analysis.
2 A Brief Literature Review
There is a nascent but growing body of literature on the role of teacher incentives on student
performance (Glazerman et al., 2009; Glewwe et al., 2010; Lavy, 2002; Lavy, 2009; Muralidharan
and Sundararaman, forthcoming; Springer et al., 2010; Vigdor, 2008.), including an emerging
literature on the optimal design of such incentives (Neal, 2011). There are four papers, three
6of them outside the US, which provide experimental estimates of the causal impact of teacher
incentives on student achievement: Duﬂo and Hanna (2005), Glewwe et al. (2010), Muralidharan
and Sundararaman (forthcoming), and Springer et al. (2010).
Duﬂo and Hanna (2005) randomly sampled 60 schools in rural India, and provided them with
ﬁnancial incentives to reduce absenteeism. The incentive scheme was simple; teachers’ pay was
linear in their attendance, at the rate of Rs 50 per day, after the ﬁrst 10 days of each month. They
found that teacher absence rate was signiﬁcantly lower in treatment schools (22 percent) compared
to control schools (42 percent), and that student achievement in treatment schools were 0.17σ
higher than in control schools.
Glewwe et al. (2010) report results from a randomized evaluation that provided teachers for
grades 4 through 8 in Kenya with group incentives based on test scores and ﬁnd that while test
scores increased in program schools in the short run, students did not retain the gains after the
incentive program ended. They interpret these results as being consistent with teachers expending
eﬀort towards short-term increases in test scores but not towards long-term learning.
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (forthcoming) investigate the eﬀect of individual and group
incentives in 300 schools in Andhra Pradesh, India and ﬁnd that both group and individual incen-
tives increased student achievement by 0.12σ in language and 0.16σ in math in the ﬁrst year, both
equally successful. In the second year, however, individual incentives are shown to be more eﬀective
with an average eﬀect of 0.27σ across math and language performance, while group incentives had
an average eﬀect of 0.16σ.
Springer et al. (2010) evaluated a three-year pilot initiative on teacher incentives conducted in
the Metropolitan Nashville School System from the 2006-07 school year through the 2008-09 school
year. 296 middle school mathematics teachers who volunteered to participate in the program were
randomly assigned to the treatment or the control group, and those assigned to the treatment
group could earn up to $15,000 as a bonus if their students made gains in state mathematics test
scores equivalent to the 95 percentile in the district. They were awarded $5,000 and $10,000 if their
students made gains equivalent to the 80th and the 90th percentiles, respectively. Springer et al.
(2010) found there was no signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect on student achievement and on measures of
teachers’ response such as teaching practices.5
5There are several non-experimental evaluations of teacher incentive programs in the US, all of which report
non-signiﬁcant impact of the program on student achievement. Glazerman et al. (2009), who report a non-signiﬁcant
eﬀect of -0.04 standard deviations on student test scores for the Teacher Advancement Program in Chicago and Vigdor
(2008), who reports a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of the ABC School-wide Bonus Program in North Carolina. Outside the
US, Lavy (2002, 2009) reports signiﬁcant results for teacher incentive programs in Israel.
7The contribution of our paper is three-fold. First, the incentive scheme allows for schools to
choose how to allocate incentive payments. If schools have superior knowledge of their production
function (relative to a social planner) or better knowledge about their staﬀs, this design is optimal.
Second, our experiment is the largest on teacher incentives in American public schools by orders
of magnitude and the incentive scheme is similar to those being implemented in school districts
across the country. Third, our set of outcomes is expansive and includes information on student
achievement, student behavior, teacher retention, and teacher eﬀort.
3 Program Details
3.1 Overview
On October 17, 2007, New York City’s Mayor, Schools Chancellor, and the President of the United
Federation of Teachers (UFT) announced an initiative to provide teachers with ﬁnancial incentives
to improve student performance, attendance, and school culture. The initiative was conceived as
a two-year pilot program in roughly 400 of the lowest performing public schools in NYC.6 School
performance was tied to metrics used to calculate NYC’s school report card - a composite measure
of school environment, student academic performance, and student academic progress. The design
of the incentive scheme was left to the discretion of the school. There were three requirements:
(1) incentives were not allowed to be distributed according to seniority; (2) schools had to create a
compensation committee that consisted of the principal, a designee of the principal, and two UFT
staﬀ members; and (3) the committee’s decision had to be unanimous. The committee had the
responsibility of developing how incentives would be distributed to each teacher and other staﬀ.
Below, we describe how schools were selected and the incentive scheme, and provide an overview
of the distribution of incentive rewards to schools.
3.2 School Selection
Table 1 provides an accounting of how we selected our experimental sample. Eligible middle and
high schools were selected based on the average proﬁciency ratings on 4th and 8th grade state tests,
respectively. Eligible elementary schools were selected based on poverty rates, student demographic
characteristics such as the percentage of English Language Learners and special education students.
6The pilot program did not expand to include more schools in the second and third years due to budget constraints,
but all schools that completed the program in the ﬁrst or second year were invited to participate again in the following
years.
8The NYC Department of Education identiﬁed 438 schools that met the above mentioned eligibility
criteria. Of these schools, 34 were barred by the UFT for unknown reasons and 8 were District
75 (i.e. special education) schools. The remaining 396 comprise our experimental sample, among
which 212 schools were randomly selected by the author and oﬀered treatment.7 In November 2007,
schools in the treatment group were invited to participate in the program. To formally accept the
oﬀer, schools were required to have at least 55 percent of their active full-time staﬀ represented by
the UFT at the school to vote for the program.8 Schools forwarded voting results through email to
the DOE by late November. Of the 212 schools randomly chosen to receive treatment, 179 schools
garnered enough votes to participate, 33 declined treatment.9 To increase the number of schools
eligible to participate, we added 21 schools oﬀ the wait list; 19 garnered the requisite votes. So,
overall, 233 schools in our experimental sample were invited to participate in the program, and
198 schools actually participated. The ﬁnal experimental sample in year one consists of the lottery
sample, with 233 treatment schools and 163 control schools.10
In the second year, 195 schools out of the 198 schools that received treatment in the ﬁrst year
were invited to participate in the second year pilot program (the other three schools were closed
because of low performance). Of the 195 schools oﬀered treatment, 191 schools voted to participate
in the second year. In the third year of treatment, 191 schools that received treatment in the second
year were invited to participate; 189 schools voted to participate in the program.
3.3 Incentive Scheme
Figure 2 shows how the progress report card score, which is the basis for awarding incentives, is
calculated. Environment, which accounts for 15 percent of the progress report card score, is derived
from attendance rate (5 percent of the overall score) and learning environment surveys administered
to students, teachers, and parents in the spring semester (10 percent). Attendance rate is a school’s
average daily attendance. Student performance (25 percent) depends on the percentage of students
7There were 34 schools that met the eligibility criterion, but were excluded by the UFT for unknown reasons.
8Repeated attempts to convince the DOE and the UFT to allow schools to opt-in to the experimental group
before random assignment were unsuccessful.
9Anecdotal evidence suggests that schools declined treatment for a variety of reasons, including fear that more
work (not outlined in the agreement) would be required for bonuses. As one teacher in a focus group put it, “money
ain’t free.”Furthermore, some teachers in focus groups expressed resentment that anyone would believe that teachers
would be motivated by money.
10There were 187 elementary schools, 82 middle schools, 39 K-8 schools, 73 high schools, 1 K-12 school, and 14
schools that served both middle and high school students in the sample. 68 schools in our experimental sample also
participated in Fryer’s (2010) student incentive program in the 2007-08 and 2008-09 academic years. Excluding these
schools from the sample did not change the qualitative results.
9at grade level and the median proﬁciency ratings in ELA and math state tests for elementary and
middle schools, and the 4-year and 6-year graduation rates and diploma-weighted graduation rates
for high schools.11 Student progress, which accounts for 60 percent of the overall score, depends on
the average changes in proﬁciency ratings among students and the percentage of students making
at least a year of progress in state tests for elementary and middle schools. Student progress in high
schools is measured by the percentage of students earning more than 10 credits and the Regents
exam pass rates in the core subjects - English, math, science, United States history, and global
history. Schools can also earn extra credit points by exemplary gains in proﬁciency ratings or credit
accumulation and graduation rates among high-need students such as English Language Learners,
special education students, or those in the lowest tercile in ELA and math test scores citywide.
In each of the three categories, learning environment, student performance and student progress,
schools were evaluated by their relative performance in each metric compared to their peer schools
and all schools in the city, with performance relative to peer schools weighted three times of the
weight given to performance relative to all schools citywide. However, because it is calculated using
many metrics and because scores in each metric are calculated relative to other schools, how much
eﬀort is needed to raise the Progress Report card score by, say, one point is not obvious.
The table below shows the number of points by which schools had to increase their progress
report card scores in the 2007-08 academic year in order to be considered to have met their goal
and receive their incentive payment. The table illustrates that the target depends on the citywide
ranking based on the previous year’s Progress Report card score. If, for example, an elementary
school was ranked at the 20th percentile in the 2006-07 academic year, it needed to increase its
progress report card score by 15 points to meet the annual target.
11The DOE awards diﬀerent levels of diplomas - Local, Regents, Advanced Regents, and Advanced Regents with
Honors - depending on the number of Regents exams passed. The more Regents exams a student has to take to
obtain a diploma the more weight it was given. In the 2007-08 academic year, the weights given to Local, Regents,
Advanced Regents, and Advanced Regents diplomas were 1.0, 2.0, 2.5, and 3.0, respectively. In order to graduate
with a Local diploma, students who entered high school in September, 2004 had to receive a total of 44 credits and
score 55 or above in comprehensive English, mathematics A, global history and geography, United States history and
government, and any science Regents exams. To graduate with a Regents diploma, students had to score 65 or above
in the same ﬁve required Regents exam areas. To graduate with an Advanced Regents diploma, students had to score
65 or above in the already mentioned Regents exam areas and in addition, in mathematics B, life science, physical
science, and foreign langauge Regents exams. Further details on graduation requirement and progress report card
score calculation can be found on the DOE website.
10Progress Report Target Points
Citywide Ranking Elementary
High
Based on the Previous Year & Middle
≥ 85th percentile 7.5 2
≥ 45 and < 85 12.5 3
≥ 15 and < 45 15 4
≥ 5 and < 15 17.5 6
< 5th percentile 20 8
Notes: Numbers calculated by the author.
A. An Example
Consider the following simpliﬁed example with an elementary school that ranks at about the
10th percentile citywide, and at about the 25th percentile among its peer schools. This school would
have to increase its total progress report card scores by 17.5 points to meet the annual target. Let’s
now assume that the school increased the attendance rate to be about the 30th percentile citywide
and the 75th percentile in the peer group. Then, holding everything constant, the school will
increase the overall score by 1 point. Similarly, if the school increased their performance to the
same level, the school will increase its score by 5 points. If student progress increased to the same
level, its progress report card score will increase by 12 points. Hence, if the peer group and district
schools stay at the same level, a low-performing school would be able to meet the annual target only
if it dramatically increased its performance in all of the subareas represented in the progress report.
On the other hand, because all scores are calculated relative to other schools, some schools can
reach their incentive targets if their achievement stays constant and their peer schools underperform
in a given year.
B. A Brief Comparison With Other School District Incentive Schemes
Most school districts that have implemented performance pay use similar metrics to NYC to
measure teacher’s performance. For example, the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) in Chicago
– started by Arne Duncan and described in the quote at the beginning of this paper – rewarded
teachers based on classroom observations (25%) and school-wide student growth on Illinois state
exams (75%). Houston’s ASPIRE program uses school value added and teacher value added in state
11exams to reward the top 25% and 50% of teachers. Alaska’s Public School Performance Incentive
Program divides student achievement into six categories and rewards teachers based on the average
movement up to higher categories. Florida’s S.T.A.R used a similar approach.
A key diﬀerence between the incentive schemes piloted in America thus far and those piloted
in developing countries is that those in America compare teachers’ or schools’ performance to the
distribution in the district. That is, teachers are not rewarded unless the entire school satisﬁes
a criterion or their performance is in the top X percentile of their district, despite how well any
individual or group of teachers performs. NYC’s design rewards teachers based only on school’s
overall performance. A teacher participating in Houston’s ASPIRE program would be rewarded
the pre-determined bonus amount only if his teacher value added in one subject is in the top 25% of
the district, regardless of how he or his school performs. Chicago’s TAP program rewards teachers
similarly. This ambiguity – the likelihood of receiving an incentive depends on my eﬀort and the
eﬀort of others – may have served to ﬂatten the function that maps eﬀort into output.
3.4 Incentive Distribution
The lump-sum performance bonus awarded to a school was distributed to teachers in whatever way
the school’s compensation committee decided. Recall that the compensation committee consisted
of the principal, a designee of the principal, and two UFT staﬀ members. The committee was not
allowed to vary the bonus by seniority, but could diﬀerentiate the compensation amount by the
position held at school, by the magnitude of contribution made (e.g., teacher value added), or could
distribute the bonus amount equally. The committee was chosen by December of the ﬁrst year, and
the committee reported to the UFT and the DOE their decision on how to distribute the bonus.
School bonus results were announced in September of the following year for elementary, K-8 and
middle schools and in November for high schools, shortly after the DOE released Progress Report
cards. Rewards were distributed to teachers either by check or as an addition to their salary, in
accordance with the distribution rule decided upon by the compensation committee. In the ﬁrst
year, 104 schools out of 198 schools that participated met the improvement target and received the
full bonus, while 18 schools met at least 75 percent of the target and received half of the maximum
incentive payment possible. In total, the compensation received by participating schools totaled
$22 million. In the second year, 154 schools out of 191 schools that participated received the full
bonus, while 7 schools received half the maximum compensation. The total compensation awarded
to schools in the second year was $31 million. We do not have precise numbers for year three, but
12the DOE claims that the total costs of the experiment was approximately $75 million.
Figure 3A shows the distribution of individual compensation in the experiment. Most teachers
in the schools that received the full bonus of $3,000 per staﬀ were rewarded an amount close to
$3,000. Figure 3B presents a histogram of the fraction of teachers receiving the same amount in
each school in order to characterize how many schools decided upon an egalitarian distribution rule.
More than 80% of schools chose to reward the same bonus amount to at least 85% of the teaching
staﬀ each year.
4 Data and Research Design
We combined data from two sources: student-level administrative data on approximately 1.1 million
students across the ﬁve boroughs of the NYC metropolitan area from 2006-2007 to 2009-2010 school
year, and teacher-level human resources data on approximately 96,000 elementary and middle school
teachers during this same time period. The student level data include information on student race,
gender, free- and reduced-price lunch eligibility, behavior, attendance, matriculation with course
grades, and state math and ELA test scores for students in grades three through eight. For high
school students, our data contain Regents exam scores and graduation rates. Data on attendance
and behavioral incidences are available for all students.
Our main outcome variable is an achievement test unique to New York. The state ELA and
math tests, developed by McGraw-Hill, are high-stake exams administered to students in the third
through the eighth grade. Students in third, ﬁfth, and seventh grades must score at level 2 or
above (out of 4) on both math and ELA tests to advance to the next grade without attending
summer school. The math test includes questions on number sense and operations, algebra, geom-
etry, measurement, and statistics. Tests in the earlier grades emphasize more basic content such
as number sense and operations, while later tests focus on advanced topics such as algebra and
geometry. The ELA test is designed to assess students on three learning standards - information
and understanding, literary response and expression, critical analysis and evaluation, and includes
multiple-choice and short-response sections based on a reading and listening section, along with a
brief editing task.
All public-school students are required to take the math and ELA tests unless they are med-
ically excused or have a severe disability. Students with moderate disabilities or limited English
proﬁciency must take both tests, but may be granted special accommodations (additional time,
13translation services, and so on) at the discretion of school or state administrators. In our analysis,
test scores are normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for each grade
and year across the entire New York City sample.
We construct measures of attendance, behavioral problems and GPA using the NYC DOE data.
Attendance is measured as the number of days present divided by the number of days present plus
the number of days absent.12 Behavioral problems are measured as the total number of behavioral
incidences in record each year. GPA is measured as the mean course grade each year, calculated at
a 1-4 scale for elementary school students and a 1-100 scale for middle school students. Attendance,
behavioral problems and GPA were normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one by
grade level each year in the full New York City sample.
We use a parsimonious set of controls to aid in precision and to correct for any potential
imbalance between treatment and control groups. The most important controls are achievement
test scores from previous years, which we include in all regressions. Previous year’s test scores are
available for most students who were in the district in the previous year.13 We also include an
indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a student is missing a test score from a previous
year and zero otherwise.
Other individual-level controls include a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive set of
race dummies, indicators for free lunch eligibility, special education status, and English language
learner status. A student is income-eligible for free lunch if her family income is below 130 percent
of the federal poverty guidelines, or categorically eligible if (1) the student’s household receives
assistance under the Food Stamp Program, the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations
(FDPIR), or the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF); (2) the student was
enrolled in Head Start on the basis of meeting that program’s low-income criteria; (3) the student
is homeless; (4) the student is a migrant child; or (5) the student is a runaway child receiving
assistance from a program under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act and is identiﬁed by the
local educational liaison.
Special education status is determined through a series of observations, interviews, reviews of
report cards and administration of tests after the initial referral by teachers or parents. Student
classiﬁed as in need of special education drafts an Individualized Education Program (IEP) with
teachers and special staﬀ and follows it while integrating the general curriculum as much as possible.
12The DOE does not collect absence data from schools after the ﬁrst 180 days, so attendance rate calculated is
the rate in the ﬁrst 180 days.
13See Table 2 for exact percentages of experimental group students with valid test scores from previous years.
14English Language Learners are those who speak a language other than English at home and score
below proﬁcient on English assessments when they enter the school system. They receive support
through bilingual programs and English as a Second Language (ESL) programs.
We include other measures of academic achievement and behavior problems as controls. The
squared previous year’s state test scores are included in the parsimonious set of controls, as well as
the total number of behavioral incidences recorded in 2006-2007 school year.
We also construct school level controls. To do this, we assign each student who was present at
the beginning of the year, i.e., in September, to the ﬁrst school that they attended. We construct
the school-level variables based on these school assignments by taking the mean value of student
demographic variables and student test scores for each school. Variables constructed this way
include percentage of black, Hispanic, special education, limited English proﬁciency, and free-lunch
eligible students. Also constructed is the total number of behavioral incidences in a school in the
2006-07 academic year.
We construct teacher-level variables from NYC Human Resources (HR) records and Teacher
Value Added data. Teacher gender and race are constructed by taking the most recent non-missing
records from 2004 to 2010 HR records. Teacher experience, or years of experience as a teacher, is
taken from the October, 2007 HR ﬁle. Teacher Value Added (TVA) data are available from the
2006-2007 academic year until the 2008-2009 academic year. We take the TVA measured in the
standard deviation unit, and standardize the number by grade level each year to have mean zero
and standard deviation zero in the full city sample. For teachers who taught more than one grade,
we take the average of TVA across grade levels. In addition, we construct the cumulative teacher
absences in May of each academic year.
Table 2 provides pre-treatment descriptive statistics. The ﬁrst four columns show the mean
and standard deviation of student and teacher characteristics in all schools in the NYC district,
the experimental sample, the treatment group, and the control group. In addition, the last two
columns show the p-value of the diﬀerence between the mean of the entire district and that of the
experimental sample and the p-value of the diﬀerence between the treatment group and the control
group. The table of summary statistics shows that most student and teacher characteristics are
balanced between the treatment and the control group. The only exceptions are the percentage of
white teacher, the percentage of Asian teachers, and teacher-value-added in math in the 2006-2007
academic year.
15Research Design
The simplest and most direct test of any teacher incentive program would be to examine the
outcome of interest (e.g., test scores) regressed on an indicator for enrollment in the teacher incentive
program for grades g, in school s, in year t (incentivei,g,s,t) and controls for basic student and school
characteristics, Xi and Xs, respectively:
outcomei,g,s,t = α1 + β1Xi + γ1Xs + δg + ζt + π1incentivei,g,s,t + εi,g,s,t.
Yet, if schools select into teacher incentive programs because of important unobserved deter-
minants of academic outcomes, estimates obtained using the above equation may be biased. To
conﬁdently identify the causal impact of incentive programs, we must compare participating and
non-participating schools which would have had the same academic outcomes had they both par-
ticipated in the program. By deﬁnition, this involves an unobservable counterfactual.
In the forthcoming analysis, the counterfactual is constructed by exploiting the random assign-
ment of schools into treatment and control groups. Restricting our analysis to schools that were
selected (by the UFT and the DOE) to be included in the experimental sample, we can estimate the
causal impact of being oﬀered a chance to participate in an teacher incentive program by compar-
ing the average outcomes of schools randomly selected for treatment and the average outcomes of
schools randomly selected for control. Schools that were not chosen to participate form the control
group corresponding to the counterfactual state that would have occurred to treatment schools if
they had not been oﬀered a chance to participate.
Let Ts be an indicator for a treatment school. The mean diﬀerence in outcomes between treat-
ment schools (Ts = 1) and control schools (Ts = 0) is known as the “Intent-to-Treat” (ITT) eﬀect,
and is estimated by regressing student outcomes on Ts. In theory, predetermined student school
characteristics (Xi and Xs) should have the same distribution across treatment and control groups
because they are statistically independent of treatment assignment. In small samples, however,
more precise estimates of the ITT can often be found by controlling for these characteristics. The
speciﬁcations estimated are of the form:
outcomei,g,s,t = α2 + β2Xi + γ2Xs + π2Ts + δg + ζt + εi,s,
where our vector of student level controls, Xi, includes an indicator for gender, a mutually inclusive
and collectively exhaustive set of race dummies, an indicators for free-lunch eligibility, special
16education status, and English language learner status, separately, and pre-determined measures of
the outcome variables when possible (i.e., pre-intervention test scores and the number of behavioral
incidences). The set of school-level controls, Xs, includes the percentages of students at school who
are black, Hispanic, free-lunch eligible, English language learners, and special education students,
and the pre-lottery number of behavioral incidences at school. The ITT is an average of the causal
eﬀects for students enrolled in treatment schools compared to those enrolled in control schools, at
the time of random assignment. The ITT therefore captures the causal eﬀect of being oﬀered a
chance of participating in the incentive program, not of actually participating.
Under several assumptions (that the treatment group assignment is random, control schools are
not allowed to participate in the incentive program, and treatment assignment only aﬀects outcomes
through school enrollment), we can also estimate the causal impact of actually participating in
the incentive program. This parameter, commonly known as the “Treatment-on-Treated” (TOT)
eﬀect, measures the average eﬀect of treatment on schools that choose to participate in the merit
pay program. The TOT parameter can be estimated through a two-stage least squares regression
of student outcomes on participation, with original treatment assignment (Ts) as an instrumental
variable for participation. We use the number of years a student spent in treated schools as the
actual participation variable. The ﬁrst stage equations for IV estimation take the form:
incentivei,g,s,t = α3 + β3Xi + γ3Xs + δg + ζt + π3Ts + εi,s,g,t,
where π3 captures the eﬀect of treatment assignment (Ts) on the average number of years a student
spends in a treatment school.
The TOT is the estimated diﬀerence in outcomes between students in schools who were induced
into participating through treatment assignment and those in the control group who would have
enrolled if they had been oﬀered the chance.
5 The Impact of Teacher Incentives
5.1 Student Achievement
Table 3 presents ﬁrst-stage, ITT, and TOT estimates of the eﬀect of teacher incentives on state
math and ELA test scores. Columns one through three report estimates from our elementary
school sample, columns four through six report estimates from middle schools, and the ﬁnal three
17columns present results for a pooled sample of elementary and middle schools. We present both
raw estimates and those that contain the parsimonious set of controls described in the previous
section. Note: the coeﬃcients in the table are normalized so that they are in standard deviation
units and represent one year impacts.
Surprisingly, all estimates of the eﬀect of teacher incentives on student achievement are negative
in both elementary and middle school – and statistically signiﬁcant so in middle school. The ITT
eﬀect of the teacher incentive scheme is -0.011σ (0.020) in reading and -0.015σ (0.024) in math for
elementary schools, and -0.032σ (0.011) in reading and -0.048σ (0.017) in math for middle schools.
The eﬀect sizes in middle school are non-trivial – a student who attends a participating middle
school for three years of our experiment is expected to lose 0.096σ in reading and 0.144σ in math.
The TOT estimates are smaller than the ITT estimates, as the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcients are all larger
than one.
Table 4 presents results similar to table 3, but for high schools. High school students do not take
the New York state exams. Instead, they have to take and score 55 or above in Regents exams in
ﬁve key subject areas to graduate with a local diploma. To graduate with a Regents diploma or an
Advanced Regents diploma, students have to score 65 or above in more subject areas. For example,
students who entered high school in September 2005 had to score 65 or above in comprehensive
English, integrated algebra, global history and geography, U.S. history and government, and science
Regents exams to graduate with a Regents diploma. 14 Table 4 presents ﬁrst-stage, ITT, and TOT
estimates for the impact of teacher incentives on comprehensive English, mathematics, science, U.S.
history, and global history Regents exam scores. All exam scores were standardized to have mean
zero and standard deviation one in the full city sample each academic year.
Similar to the analysis of elementary and middle schools, there is no evidence that teacher
incentives had a positive eﬀect on achievement. Estimates of the eﬀect of teacher incentives on
high school achievement are all small and statistically non-signiﬁcant. The ITT eﬀect on the
English Regents exam score is -0.003σ (0.044), the eﬀect on the integrated algebra exam score is
-0.011σ (0.031), and the eﬀect on science scores is -0.016σ (0.037). The ITT eﬀect on U.S. history
exam score is -0.033σ (0.054) and that on global history exam score is -0.063σ (0.045). The TOT
14Regents exams are oﬀered in January, June, and August of each academic year in the following subject areas:
comprehensive English, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, chemistry, physics, biology, living environment, earth sci-
ence, world history, U.S. history, and foreign languages. In this paper, we present results on comprehensive English,
integrated algebra, living environment, U.S. history, and global history Regents exam scores. Among mathematics
and science exam areas, integrated algebra and living environment were selected because the highest number of
students took those exams. Using other exam scores gives qualitatively similar results.
18eﬀect is of a comparable magnitude.
The bottom panel of table 4 reports treatment eﬀects on four-year graduation rates. The
dependent variables are a dummy for graduating in 4 years, which takes the value one if student
graduated in 4 years and zero otherwise, and a dummy for graduating in 4 years with a Regents
diploma, which takes the value one if student graduated with a Regents diploma and zero otherwise.
Students enrolled in treatment schools were 4.4 percent less likely to graduate in four years (which
is statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level) and were 7.4 percent less likely to obtain a Regent’s diploma
(statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level). Note: during the period of the experiment, mean graduation
rates ﬂuctuated between 54% and 61%.
Table 5 explores heterogeneity in treatment eﬀects across a variety of subsamples of the data:
gender, race, free-lunch eligibility, previous years student test scores, school size, teacher value-
added, and teacher salary. The coeﬃcients in the table are ITT estimates with our parsimonious
set of controls. All categories are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The eﬀect of
teacher incentives on achievement does not vary systematically across the subsamples. The only
exceptions are among middle school students who are free-lunch eligible, students who are attending
larger schools, and those taught by more experienced teachers (i.e., received higher salaries), and
among high school students who are white or Asian, students who scored lower in 8th grade state
tests, and students who are attending larger schools. Students in these subsamples seem to be
aﬀected more negatively by teacher incentives.
The estimates above use the sample of students for which I have achievement test scores. If
students in treatment and control schools have diﬀerent rates of selection into this sample, my
results may be biased. A simple test for selection bias is to investigate the impact of the treatment
oﬀer on the probability of entering the sample. The results of this test, though not shown here in
tabular form, demonstrate that the coeﬃcient on treatment is small and statistically zero.15 This
suggests that diﬀerential attrition is not likely to be a concern in interpreting the results.
5.2 Alternative Outcomes
Thus far, we have concentrated on student progress on state assessments, the most heavily weighted
element of NYC’s incentive scheme. Now, we introduce two additional measures of student perfor-
mance and three measures of school environment: grade point averages, predictive math and ELA
exams, school environment surveys, attendance and behavioral incidences. Many of these outcomes
15Tabular results are available from the author upon request.
19enter directly into the incentive scheme and may be aﬀected by it.
Table 6 shows estimates of the impact of teacher incentives on this set of alternative outcomes.
Predictive assessments are highly correlated with the state exams and are administered to all public
school students in grades three through eight in October and May. The DOE gives several diﬀerent
types of predictive exams, and schools can choose to use one of the options depending on their
needs. In this paper, we analyze math and ELA test scores from the spring Acuity Predictive
Assessment.16 Each student’s attendance rate is calculated as the total number of days present
in any school divided by the total number of days enrolled in any school. Attendance rate was
standardized by grade level to have mean zero and standard deviation one each academic year
across the full city sample. Grades were extracted from ﬁles containing the transcripts of all
students in the district.17 Elementary school students received letter grades, which were converted
to a 4.0 scale, and middle and high school students received numeric grades that ranged from
1 to 100. Students’ grades from each academic year were averaged to yield an annual GPA. As
with test scores, GPAs were standardized to have mean of zero and standard deviation of one
among students in the same grade with the same grade scale across the school district. Number
of behavioral incidences were pulled from behavior data, which record the date, level, location and
short description of all incidences. The total number of incidences attributed to a student in an
academic year across all schools and grades he attended was calculated, and standardized by grade
level to have mean zero and standard deviation one each academic year across the full city sample.
Results from predictive assessments provide an identical portrait to that depicted by state
test scores. The eﬀect of the teacher incentive program on predictive ELA exams is negative and
statistically insigniﬁcant, with the ITT eﬀect equal to -0.019σ (0.016) in the elementary school
sample and -0.022σ (0.018) in the middle school sample. The ITT eﬀect on predictive math exams
is -0.023σ (0.020) in the elementary school sample and -0.051σ (0.022) in the middle school sample.
Note that the eﬀect of teacher incentives on middle school students’ predictive math exam scores
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, consistent with the ﬁndings with state test scores.
Teacher incentives have a statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect on other alternative student outcomes.
The ITT and TOT eﬀects on attendance rate, which enters directly in the calculation of progress
report card scores are negative across all school levels. The ITT eﬀect is estimated to be -0.018σ
16Eighth grade students did not take the spring predictive tests, because they did not have to take state exams in
the following year.
17Elementary school transcripts are not available for all schools each academic year. High school transcripts were
not availble until the 2008-09 academic year.
20(0.020) in the elementary school sample, -0.019σ (0.022) in the middle school sample, and -0.014σ
(0.050) in the high school sample. The eﬀects on behavioral incidences and grade point averages
are similarly small and insigniﬁcant.
5.3 Teacher Behavior
In this section, we estimate the impact of the teacher incentive program on two important teacher
behaviors: absences and retention. We assign teachers to treatment or control groups if they were
assigned to a treatment or a control school, respectively, in October of 2007. We only include
teachers who were teaching at schools in the randomization sample in 2007, and ignore all who
enter the system afterwards.
We measure retention in two ways: in school and in district – both of which were constructed
using Human Resources data provided by DOE. Retention in school was constructed as a dummy
variable that takes the value one if a teacher was associated with the same school in the following
academic year, and zero otherwise. Retention in district is more complicated. Like our coding
of retention in school, we construct a dummy variable that takes the value one if a teacher was
found in the New York City school district’s Human Resources (HR) ﬁle in the following academic
year, and zero otherwise. But there are two important caveats. First, charter schools and high
schools are not included in the New York City public school district’s HR ﬁles and therefore, some
teachers who left the district may have simply moved to teach at charter schools or high schools
in the district. As the same types of teacher certiﬁcates qualify teachers to teach in both middle
and high schools, it is possible that some teachers who left the district from middle schools went
to teach at high schools. It is unlikely, however, that a signiﬁcant number of elementary school
teachers obtained new certiﬁcates to qualify for teaching in middle schools. Therefore, we divided
the sample of teachers into elementary, middle and K-8 school samples and estimate the treatment
eﬀects separately on each sample. To measure absences, we were given the number of personal
absences as of May for teachers who did not exit the system.
Table 7 presents results on the impact of teacher incentives on our measures of teacher behavior.
There is no evidence that teacher incentives aﬀect retention in either district or school, or teacher
absences. Elementary school teachers in treatment schools were 0.2 percent more likely to stay in the
NYC school district, 0.7 percent less likely to stay at the same school in the following academic year,
and took 0.275 more days of personal absences. Middle school teachers exhibit similar patterns.
None of these eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant, nor are they economically meaningful.
216 Discussion
The previous sections demonstrate that the teacher incentive scheme piloted in 200 New York City
public schools did not increase achievement. If anything, achievement may have declined as a
result of the experiment. Yet, incentive schemes in developing countries have proven successful at
increasing achievement.
In this section, we consider four explanations for these stark diﬀerences: (1) incentives may
not have been large enough; (2) the incentive scheme was too complex; (3) group-based incentives
may not be eﬀective; and (4) teachers may not know how they can improve student performance.
Using our analysis, along with data gleaned from other experiments, we argue that the most likely
explanation is that the NYC incentive scheme, along with all other American pilot initiatives thus
far, is too complex and provides teachers with too little agency. It is important to note that we
cannot rule out the possibility that other unobservable diﬀerences between the developing countries
and America (e.g. teacher motivation) produce the diﬀerences.
Incentives Were Not Large Enough
One potential explanation for our stark results is that the incentives simply were not large
enough. There are two reasons that the incentives to increase achievement in NYC may have been
small. First, although schools had discretion over how to distribute the incentives to teachers if they
met their performance targets, an overwhelming majority of them chose to pay teachers equally.
These types of egalitarian distribution methods can induce free-riding and undercut individual
incentives to put in eﬀort. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of teachers in schools that met
the annual target earned am amount close to $3000. This is less than 4.1 percent of the average
annual teacher salary in the sample. One might think that the bonus was simply not large enough
for teachers to put in more eﬀort, though similar incentive schemes in India (3%) and Kenya (2%)
were relatively smaller.
Second, the measures used to calculate the progress report card scores directly inﬂuence other
accountability measures such as the AYP (Adequate Yearly Progress) that determine whether a
school will be subjected to regulations or even be closed, which results in all staﬀ losing their jobs.
Hence, all poor performing schools, including all treatment and control schools in our experiment,
have incentives to perform well on the precise measures that were being incentivized. Thus, it is
not clear whether the teacher incentive program provides additional incentives, at the margin, for
teachers to behave diﬀerently.
22A brief look at the results of the Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT), a pilot initiative
in Nashville, Tennessee, suggests that a larger incentive in schools which are not under pressure
by AYP was still not any more eﬀective. Teachers in POINT treatment schools were selected from
the entire school district and could earn up to $15,000 in a year based solely on their students’
test scores. Teachers whose performance was at lower thresholds could earn $5,000 to $10,000.
The maximum amount is roughly 22% of the average teacher salary in Nashville. Springer et al.
(2010) ﬁnd that even though about half of the participating teachers could have reached the lowest
bonus threshold if their students answered on average 2 or 3 more items out of 55 items correctly,
student achievement did not increase signiﬁcantly more in classrooms taught by treatment teachers.
Moreover, they report that treatment teachers did not seem to change their instructional practices
or eﬀort level.
Incentive Scheme Was Too Complex
In our experiment it was diﬃcult, if not impossible, for teachers to know how much eﬀort they
should exert or how that eﬀort inﬂuences student achievement because of the complexity of the
progress report card system used in NYC. For example, the performance score for elementary and
middle schools is calculated using the percentage of students at proﬁciency level and the median
proﬁciency rating in state tests. Recall, the performance score depends on how a school performs
compared to its peer schools that had similar student achievement level in the previous year and
compared to all schools in the district. But it is highly unlikely that teachers can predict at which
percentile their school will be placed relative to the peer group and the district in these measures of
performance if the school increased the overall student achievement by, for example, one standard
deviation.
Moreover, the POINT pilot in Tennessee, like other American school districts, contained an
incentive scheme that was dependent on the performance of others rather than simpler incentive
schemes such as those in Duﬂo and Hanna (2005), Glewwe et al. (2010), and Muralidharan and
Sundararaman (forthcoming). It is plausible that this ambiguity may have served to ﬂatten the
function that maps eﬀort into expected reward.
Group-Based Rewards Are Ineﬀective
Although we gave schools the ﬂexibility to choose their own incentive schemes, the vast majority
of them settled on a group-based scheme. Group-based incentive schemes introduce the potential
for free-riding and may be ineﬀective under certain conditions. Yet, in some contexts, they have
23been shown to be eﬀective. For example, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (forthcoming) found
that the group incentive scheme in government-run schools in India had a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on student achievement. However, the authors stress that 92% of treatment schools had
between two and ﬁve teachers. The average number of teachers in a treated school was 3.28.
Similar results are obtained in Glewwe et al. (2010) where the average number of teachers per
school was twelve. Provided that New York City public schools have 60 teachers on average, the
applicability of the results from these analyses is suspect. When there are only 3 (or 12) teachers
in a school, monitoring and imposing cost on those teachers who shark their responsibility is less
costly.
On the other hand, Lavy (2002) also suggests that group-based incentives may be eﬀective in
larger schools. His non-experimental evaluation of the teacher incentives intervention in Israel, in
which teachers were incentivized on the average number of credit units per student, the proportion
of students receiving a matriculation certiﬁcate, and the dropout rate, reveals that the program
had a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the average number of credits and test scores. The average
number of teachers in the treatment schools in Israel is approximately 80, closer to the average
number of teachers in a school in NYC.
Teachers are ignorant, not lazy
If teachers only have a vague idea of how they could increase student achievement, then there
may be little incentive to increase eﬀort. The most striking evidence against the hypothesis that
our results are driven by teachers’ lack of knowledge of the production function is driving our results
is presented in table 8, which displays treatment eﬀects on ﬁve areas of the teacher survey which
partly determined 10 percent of the school’s overall progress report score. As before, we present
ﬁrst stage, ITT, and TOT estimates for each dependent variable.
The ﬁrst outcome is the teachers’ response rate to the learning environment survey. The next
four outcomes are the teacher’s average responses to four areas of the survey questions: academic
expectations, communication, engagement, and safety and respect. Questions in the academic
expectations area measures how well a school develops rigorous academic goals for students. The
communication area examines how well a school communicates its academic goals and requirements
to the community. The engagement area measures the degree to which a school involves students,
parents, and educators to promote learning. Questions in the safety and respect section asks
whether a school provides a physically and emotionally secure learning environment. The scores
24were standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one by school level in the full city
sample.
One might predict that teachers in the incentive program would be more likely to ﬁll out
the survey and give higher scores to their schools given that they can increase the probability
of receiving the performance bonus by doing so. This requires no knowledge of the production
function - just an understanding of the incentive scheme. Table 8 reveals that treatment teachers
were not signiﬁcantly more likely to ﬁll out school surveys. The mean response rate at treatment
schools was 64% in the 2007-2008 academic year and 76% in the 2008-2009 academic year. This
may indicate that teachers did not even put in the minimum eﬀort of ﬁlling out teacher surveys in
order to earn the bonus.
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7 Online Data Appendix
7.1 Student Level Variables
Assignment to School and Grade
A non-negligible number of students attended more than one schools and grades in each aca-
demic year. In order to ensure that results are not driven by students’ self-selection into treatment
schools, we assigned students to the ﬁrst school and grade they were present in each academic year.
If there are multiple schools and grades with the same attendance patterns, we assigned students
to the school with the lowest alphanumeric order dbn and the the lowest grade.
Assignment to Treatment or Control
Students were assigned to treatment and control group if they attended treatment or control
school, respectively, in the 2007-08 academic year. If students did not attend any school in New
York City in September, they were not included in the sample. If there were more than one schools
with the same attendance patterns, students were dropped from the sample.
Treatment Variable in TOT regressions
The fraction of an academic year spent in any treated school was calculated for each student,
by taking the number of days spent in treated schools and dividing the number by the maximum
number of days student could be present at a school. The treatment variable in TOT regressions
was constructed by taking the cumulative years spent in treated schools. For example, if a student
spent 0.9 year in treated schools in year 1, 0.8 in year 2, and 0.5 in year 3, his treatment variable
would be 0.9 in year 1, 1.7 in year 2, and 2.2 in year 3.
Demographic Variables
DOE provided Edlabs with enrollment ﬁles that contained student sex, race, free lunch sta-
tus, English language learner status, and special education status for academic years 2003-04 to
2009-10. Demographic variables that should be constant over time, such as sex and race, were
constructed by taking the most recent non-missing records from the enrollment ﬁles. Other student
characteristics - free lunch eligibility status, English language learner status, and special education
30status - were constructed from each year’s enrollment ﬁle. All demographic variables were coded
as dummy variables that take the value one if student belongs to the demographic group and zero
otherwise.
State Test Scores
NYC DOE administers state ELA and math assessment tests in January and March of each
academic year to students in grades three through eight. All students in public schools must take
the tests unless they are medically excused or have severe disabilities. Students with limited English
proﬁciency or mild disabilities have to take the tests, but are granted special accomodations. ELA
and math assessments are developed by McGraw-Hill and include multiple-choice sessions and
short and extended response questions, as well as editing tasks in ELA in some grade levels. ELA
assessments ask students to draw conclusions, compare and contrast information and ideas, interpret
meaning and explain cause-and-eﬀect relationships. Math assessments ask students to demonstrate
the knowledge of and apply facts and deﬁnitions, read and interpret graphs and tables, and represent
concepts with mathematical signs and symbols. Students in the third, ﬁfth, and seventh grades
must score proﬁcient or above to advance to the next grade.
NYC DOE provided test score data that contained grade level, proﬁciency level, and scale test
scores for each subject for academic years 2006-07 to 2009-10. We standardized scale scores to
have mean zero and standard deviation one by grade level and by academic year over the full city
sample. The 2006-07 academic year’s ELA and math scale scores were included as control variables
in all raw regressions, and the squared 2006-07 ELA and math scale scores were used in addi-
tion in all control regressions on the elementary and the middle school samples. The most recent
8th grade ELA and Math test scores taken before the 2007-08 academic year were constructed for
high school students and similarly used as control variables in regressions on the high school sample.
Regents Exam Scores
New York State Department of Education requires high school students to pass a certain num-
ber of Regents examinations in core subjects to graduate and awards diﬀerent levels of diplomas
depending on the number of exams passed. For example, in order to earn a local diploma, a student
who entered high school in 2007 would have to obtain 55 points or above in comprehensive English,
mathematics, global history, U.S. history, and science Regents exams. To earn a Regents diploma,
he would have to obtain 65 points or above in all subject areas mentioned above.
31Regents exams are administered in ﬁve subject areas - ELA, math, science, foreign language,
and social studies - three times every year in January, June, and August. Students can choose when
to take each subject exam, and they can also choose to satisfy regents requirements with approved
alternative assessments such as the SAT subject tests.
DOE provided Regents exam data for academic years 2007-08 to 2009-10. Each data ﬁle con-
tained Regents exam codes and scores. There are multiple exams oﬀered under each subject area.
We restricted our attention to one exam per subject areas taken by the highest number of students.
For example, we used integrated algebra scores among mathematics exams and living environment
exam scores among science exams. We standardized exam scores to have mean zero and standard
deviation one by exam codes over the full city sample. We calculated the average of all standardized
scores of regents exams taken in the subject in a given academic year, and used the resulting value
as the standardized Regents score.
In this paper, we use comprehensive English, mathematics, science, U.S. history, and global
history Regents exam scores as high school outcome variables.
Predictive Exam Scores
Every NYC school uses periodic assessment to monitor students’ progress towards the state
learning standards. DOE provides several options including Acuity Predictive Assessments, Acuity
Instructionally Targeted Assessments, Performance Series Computer Adaptive Assessments, etc.
Schools choose from these options depending on their needs.
Of these period assessments, DOE provided Acuity Predictive Assessment results for all stu-
dents who took the exams in 2007-08 and 2008-09. Acuity Predictive Assessments closely mirror
state tests, and are designed to predict student performance level at state tests so that students and
teachers can learn how much work is needed and where they should focus in order to pass the state
learning standards. Acuity Predictive Assessments are administered to students in grades three
through eight once in the fall, and once in the spring. Predictive ELA exams were administered in
late October and late May and predictive math exams were administered in January and late May
in the 2007-08 and 2008-09 academic years. We took percentage points from the data ﬁles, and
standardized the scores by grade and by the test period to have mean zero and standard deviation
one over the full city sample of students with valid scores.
Attendance Rate
32DOE provided monthly attendance data ﬁles that record the number of days present and the
number of days absent in each school and grade students were enrolled in. Attendance rate was
calculated by ﬁrst taking the sum of the number of days present across all schools and grades
students attended in a year and dividing the number by the total number of days students were
enrolled in any school and grade. Then, attendance rate was standardized by the assigned grade
level to have mean zero and standard deviation one over the full city sample.
Behavioral Incidences
DOE provided incidence-level behavioral records of students for academic years 2006-07 to
2009-10. Records included information on the place, time and the severity level of incidences. We
assumed that students who attended school in NYC in the academic year and were not found in the
behavioral ﬁles did not have any behavioral incidence that year. We calculated the total number of
behavioral incidences at all levels attributed to students each year. We standardized the number
of incidences by assigned grade to have mean zero and standard deviation one over the full city
sample.
We also constructed school-level total number of behavioral incidences as the total number of
incidences committed at school each academic year. If school was open in the academic year and
was not found in the behavioral ﬁles, it was assumed that there was no behavioral incidence in that
school.
GPA
GPA was constructed from course grade data ﬁles that contained the grades received in all
courses taken in each academic year. Elementary and middle school grades were available for all
academic years from 2006-07 to 2009-10, and high school grades were available from 2008-09. El-
ementary school grades were calculated in the 1-4 scale, and middle and high school grades were
calculated in the 1-100 scale. I dropped duplicate records that have the same course code and grade
within an academic year, and calculated the yearly GPA as an average grade across all the courses
taken that year. GPA was standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one by grade
and by academic year over the full city sample.
Graduation
DOE provided four-year graduation results for cohorts who entered high school in 2004 and
332005. Graduation status is coded as a dummy variable that takes the value one if student graduted
in four years, and zero otherwise. We also constructed dummy variables for graduating with Regents
diploma or higher for students who graduated high school in four years.
7.2 Teacher Level Variables
Demographic Variables
DOE provided Human Resources data, which contained teacher sex, race, date of birth, ex-
perience, and salary step, from academic years 2004-05 to 2009-10. Demographic variables, such
as sex and race, were constructed and coded in the same way as student demographic variables.
Teacher salary and years of teaching experience before the 2007-08 academic year were taken from
the Human Resources data, and used as control variables in teacher level regressions, along with
gender and race dummies.
Teacher Value Added
DOE provided multi-year teacher value added data, which contained TVA measured in stan-
dard deviation units in every classroom. Teacher value added measures the changes in student
achievement attributable to classrooms controlling for a large set of student and classroom level
variables18. We dropped TVA values in classrooms taught by more than one teachers or by teachers
with blank IDs. TVA measures were standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one
by grade level over all classrooms in the city. If teachers taught multiple classrooms, the average of
standardized teacher value added measures was taken across all classrooms taught in the academic
year. The 2006-07 ELA and Math TVA values were used as control variables in all teacher level
regressions.
Teacher Absences
DOE provided a supplement to teacher value added data containing teacher identiﬁer, demo-
graphic characteristics such as gender, race, experience, and salary step, and personal or DOE-
related cumulative absences in May of the academic year. We took the cumulative number of
personal absences in May for 2007-08 and 2008-09 academic years. Teachers who left the system
before May were set to have missing absences.
18For a detailed description of the model used to calculate teacher value added, please visit the NYC DOE’s
website.
347.3 School Level Variables
Student Characteristics
We constructed school-level measures of student characteristics by taking the average of stu-
dent demographic dummy variables and test scores over students assigned to each school by the
rule described previously. Among the variables constructed, the percentages of blacks, Hispanics,
special education students, limited English proﬁciency students, and free-lunch eligible students
were included in the parsimonious set of controls in student-level control regressions. The percent-
ages of blacks, Hispanics, Asians, other race students, males, free-lunch eligible students, special
education students, English language learners, and students missing information on gender, race,
free-lunch eligibility or special education status in the enrollment data were used as control vari-
ables in school-level regressions, along with average 2006-07 ELA and math state test scores for
elementary or middle schools and average 8th grade ELA and math test scores for high schools.
Teacher Characteristics
School-level measures of teacher characteristics are constructed similarly, by taking the average
of teacher demographic dummy variables and standardized value-added measures over teachers who
were at each school in October of the academic year.
Progress Report
Progress Report overall scores and sub-scores were obtained from the data ﬁles released on the
DOE website. The overall scores and sub-scores were standardized by school type - Elementary,
Middle, and High School - to have mean zero and standard deviation one each academic year. The
progress report overall score and the squared overall score from the 2006-07 academic year was used
as a control variable in all school-level regressions.
Survey Results
DOE posts school-level summary results for teacher, parent, and student learning environment
surveys on its website. We took teacher survey response rates and subscores in the areas of aca-
demic expectations, communication, engagement, and safety and respect from the data ﬁles. The
subscores were standardized by school level and by academic year to have mean zero and standard
deviation one.
35Figure 1: NAEP Achievement Scores, 1978-
2004Figure 2: Progress Report Card MetricsAppendix Figure 1: A Map of Treatment and Control SchoolsTable 1: Sample Accounting
Number of Number of Observations
Schools Elementary Middle High
Met the eligibility criteria 438
Barred by the UFT 34
Special district schools 8
Experimental sample 396 177,861 157,616 207,741
Treatment group 233 104,823 93,472 115,518
Control group 163 73,038 64,144 92,223
O ered treatment in year 1 233
Treated in year 1 198
O ered treatment in year 2 195
Treated in year 2 191
O ered treatment in year 3 191
Treated in year 3 189
Valid state ELA exam scores 172,660 151,059 -
Valid state math exam scores 173,170 151,446 -
Valid Regents English exam scores - 55,754
Valid Regents math exam scores - 53,657
Valid Regents science exam scores - 56,789
Valid Regents U.S. history exam scores - 50,160
Valid Regents global history exam scores - 61,881
NOTES: The number of observations is deﬁned as the number of records of student and academic
year pairs in the sample. The rows denoted valid state or Regents exam scores report the number





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 3: The Impact of Teacher Incentives on Student Achievement, Elementary and Middle School
Elementary Middle Pooled
First ITT TOT First ITT TOT First ITT TOT
Stage Stage Stage
ELA: Raw 1.319** -0.010 -0.008 1.139** -0.033** -0.029** 1.236** -0.020 -0.017
(0.052) (0.022) (0.017) (0.042) (0.012) (0.011) (0.036) (0.014) (0.011)
N 172660 172660 172660 151059 151059 151059 323719 323719 323719
ELA: Controls 1.323** -0.011 -0.008 1.140** -0.032** -0.028** 1.236** -0.020 -0.016
(0.050) (0.020) (0.015) (0.043) (0.011) (0.010) (0.035) (0.013) (0.010)
N 172660 172660 172660 151059 151059 151059 323719 323719 323719
Math: Raw 1.318** -0.017 -0.013 1.138** -0.053** -0.047** 1.235** -0.033* -0.027*
(0.052) (0.025) (0.019) (0.042) (0.018) (0.016) (0.036) (0.017) (0.014)
N 173170 173170 173170 151446 151446 151446 324616 324616 324616
Math: Controls 1.321** -0.015 -0.012 1.139** -0.048** -0.042** 1.235** -0.031* -0.025*
(0.050) (0.024) (0.018) (0.043) (0.017) (0.015) (0.035) (0.016) (0.013)
N 173170 173170 173170 151446 151446 151446 324616 324616 324616
NOTES: Each column reports results from separate regressions. The ﬁrst three columns report results on the sample
with test grade levels 3 to 5 and the next three columns on the sample with grade levels 6 to 8. The last three columns
report results on the pooled sample. The dependent variables are the state ELA and math scores standardized to have
mean zero and standard deviation one by grade level each academic year in the full city sample. Scores from all three
years of implementation are used. First-stage regression uses the number of years that student received treatment as the
outcome variable and reports the coe cient on the dummy variable for being randomized into the treatment group. The
Intent-to-Treat estimates report the e ect of being assigned to the treatment group. The Treatment-on-Treated estimates
report the e ect of spending time in treated schools, using the random assignment into the treatment group as the
instrument. Raw regressions control for 2006-07 state test scores, test grade level dummies, and year ﬁxed e ects. Control
regressions include student demographic variables and school characteristics as additional control variables. Standard
errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at school level. The number of observations, denoted N and deﬁned in Table
1, is also reported. * denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level and ** at 5% level.T
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